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CONFLICT OF LAWS IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS IN FIELD 
CODE STATES OTHER THAN CALIFORNIA 
JOSEPH M. CORMACK* 
The following discussion is supplementary to that in the preceding 
article by the present writer discussing the California conflict of laws rules 
in regard to contracts. The relevant statutory situation is the same in the 
other Field Code States, which are Montana, North and South Dakota, 
and Oklahoma. While in the preceding article five sections of the Cali-
fornia codes are discussed, the conclusion is reached that the situation is 
controlled by the provision reading as follows, which appears in identical 
form in each of the other States : 
"A contract is to be interpreted according to the law and usage of 
the place where it is to be performed; or ,1 if it does not indicate 
a place of performance, according to the law and usage o£ the 
place where it is made."2 
It is pointed out in the preceding article that this provision strongly indi-
cates that the controlling principle is that all contract matters are governed 
by the law of the place of performance.3 If in the courts throughout the 
country the law of the place of execution has been used for any purpose, 
it has always controlled interpretation, contrary to the statute quoted.4 To 
use the law of the place of performance to govern interpretation, and 
that of the place of execution to govern other contract matters, would 
result in an unnatural and hitherto unheard of system of jurisprudence. 
The line of thought set forth in the preceding article will not be further 
repeated. If the reader is not familiar with conflict of laws problems 
relating to contracts, and the various solutions worked out by the courts 
in dealing with them, or there is any question in the reader's mind as to 
the scope of the present discussion, he may go over the first section of the 
preceding article. The second section of that article5 discusses the various 
code provisions in detail; the third6 deals with special problems having 
to do with the expressed or implied intention of the parties as to what law 
*[Professor of Law, University of Southern California.] 
lThe following portion does not relate to a conflict of laws problem within the 
scope of the present discussion. If the parties have not indicated a place of perform-
ance,· ex necessitate the law of place of execution must be applied. 
2Cal.Civ.Code (1937), §1646. See discussion, preceding article, at footnotes 
##18-21. The position of the quoted provision in the codes of the other States, 
and the situation in the other States with regard to the other statutory provisions 
discussed in the preceding article, will be indicated in a footnote in connection with 
the name of each State. 
3See text, preceding article, at footnote #21. 
4See qualification of this statement in text of preceding article, at footnote #20. 
5See text, preceding article, at footnote #18. 
6See text, preceding article, at footnote #27. 
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shall control. The present discussion will continue with a consideration of 
the decisions in each of the States.7 
MoNTANA8 
In Capital Finance Corporation v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany,9 Mr. Chief Justice Callaway, citing the code provision quoted, said: 
"The contract between Krogman and the defendant, made in this 
state, is governed by the laws of this state.''10 
As the opinion does not indicate where the' contract under consideration was 
to be performed, it is consistent with the statement of the learned Chief 
Justice to believe that he meant to refer to the latter part of the code 
section, providing that the law of the place of execution is to control when 
no place of performance is specified. From the standpoint of the present 
discussion, this does not involve a conflict of laws problem, since, if no 
place of performance is designa_ted, ex necessitate the law of the place of 
execution must be applied. As the suit involved a life insurance policy, it 
seems unlikely that there was no place of performance specified. If it 
was provided that New York was to be the place of performance, the code 
provision would seem not to require the court to look to the place of 
execution, and, inferentially, in accordance with previous discussion,U to 
require it to look to the law of the place of performance. If so, the state-
ment of the court is in conflict with the statute. While the statement in the 
opinion is not technically dictum, the nature of the problem under considera-
tion is such that it seems obvious that the same result would have been 
reached if the matter had been worked out as one of New York law. 
There was therefore no occasion for the court to give close attention to 
the conflict of laws aspects of the case, and the decision can not be regarded 
as having any appreciable weight in connection with our problem. 
In Bank of Commerce v. Fuqua/2 decided prior to the code provision, 
7AII decisions cited by Professor Beale in his discussion of the position taken by 
each State in regard to contracts have been examined; and independent search for 
authorities has been made. For Professor Beale's discussion, see 2 Beale, Conflict 
of Laws (1935), 1152, 1159, 1161 & 1164, §§332.34, 332.41, 332.43 & 332.48. 
SThe quoted code provision appears in Mont.Rev.Codes (1935), §7537, enacted 
1895. The other code provisions discussed in the preceding article, and regarded as 
not controlling, appear in Mont.Rev.Codes (1935), as follows: Cal. Code Civ.Proc. 
(1937), §1857, discussed in text, preceding article, at footnote #22, is §10518; Cal. 
Civ.Code (1937), §3268, discussed in text, preceding article, at footnote #38, is §8597; 
Cal.Civ.Code (1937), §1643, discussed in text, preceding article, at footnote #52, is 
§7534; Cal.Civ.Code (1937), §3541, discussed in text, preceding article, at footnote 
#54, is §8770. 
075 Mont. 460, 243 Pac. 1061 (1925). 
lOCapital Finance Corp. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 75 Mont. 460, 464, 243 
Pac. 1061, 1062 (1925). 
llSee preceding article, at footnotes # #3-4. 
1211 Mont. 285, 294, 28 Pac. 291, 293, 14 L.R.A. 588, 590, 28 Am.St.Rep. 461, 466 
(1891). 
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and McManus v. Fulton, 13 not referring to the code provision, there are 
dicta to the effect that the validity of contracts is to be governed by the 
law of the place of execution. 
In Styles v. Byrne14 it is held that the question of who may become 
beneficiaries under a fraternal benefit policy is to be determined by the 
law of the State of incorporation. This· result is required under the full 
faith and credit clause by the cited decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court.14a 
The value of these decisions as precedents in the present connection is 
negligible. It may therefore be concluded, in the light of the code provi-
sion, that it is the Montana rule that all contract matters are governed by 
the law of the place of performance. 
NoRTH DAKOTAn; 
While the existence of the quoted code section is recognized by dictum 
in an earlier decision,16 the leading case is Douglas County State Bank v. 
Sutherland, 17 in which, without referring to the statutory provision, it was 
held that the validity of a contract is governed by the law of the place of 
execution. Dicta to the same effect appear in other cases.1s An earlier 
dictum holds that the law of the place of performance controls.19 There 
is no reference to the code provision in connection with any of the dicta. 
There are also dicta relating to the effect to be given to the intention of the 
parties as to what law shall apply.20 
In two decisions, the public policy of the State was held to prevent 
application of a rule of substantive law in regard to contracts different 
1385 Mont. 170, 183, 278 •Pac. 126, 131, 67 A.L.R 690, 698 (1929). 
1489 Mont. 243, 253, 296 Pac. 577, 579 (1931). 
14aSupreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531, 35 S.Ct. 724, 
59 L.Ed. 1089, L.RA.1916A 771 (1915); Modern Woodmen v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 
45 Sup.Ct. 389, 69 L.Ed. 783, 41 A.L.R. 1384 (1925). To the same effect: Sovereign 
Camp. W. 0. W. v. Bolin, 304 U.S. 557, 59 Sup.Ct. 35, 83 L.Ed.(Adv.Ops.) 58 (1938). 
15The quoted code provision appears in N.D.Comp.Laws (1913), §5906, enacted 
1877. Cal. Code Civ.Proc. (1937), §1857, discussed in text, preceding article, at footnote 
#22, and regarded as not controlling, is not in force in North Dakota. The other 
code provisions discussed in the preceding article, also regarded as not controlling, 
appear in N.D.Comp.Laws (1913), as follows: Cal.Civ.Code (1937), §3268, discussed 
in text, preceding article, at footnote #38, is §7136; Cal.Civ.Code (1937), §1643, dis-
cussed in text, preceding article, at tootnote #52, is §5903; Cal.Civ.Code (1937), 
§3541, discussed in text, preceding article, at footnote #54, is §7275. 
16Cosgrave v. McAvay, 24 N.D. 343, 348, 139 N.W. 693, 695 (1913). 
1752 N.D. 617, 627, 629, 204 N.W. 683, 685, 686 (1925). 
18Hanson v. Great Northern R R, 18 N.D. 324, 328, 121 N.W. 78, 79, 138 
Am.St.Rep. 768, 770 (1909) ; Continental Supply Co. v. Syndicate Trust Co., 52 N.D. 
209, 222, 202 N.W. 404, 409 (1924); Storing v. National Surety Co., 56 N.D. 14, 20, 
215 N.W. 874, 876 (1927). 
19United States Sav. & Loan Co. v. Shain, 8 N.D. 136, 141, 77 N.W. 1006, 1008 
(1898). 
20United States Sav. & Loan Co. v. Shain, 8 N.D. 136, 140, 141, 77 N.W. 1006 
1008 (1898); Storing v. National Surety Co., 56 N.D. 14, 20, 215 N.W. 875, 876 
(1927). 
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from that of the forum.21 Such cases throw no light upon our problem, 
as they do not involve a choice between the law of the places of execution 
and of performance. A court which completely followed the public policy 
of the forum in this sense would not require any other conflict of laws 
principle. 
Until the effect of the code provision is considered, the law of North 
Dakota must remain in an uncertain condition. A forced reconciliation 
between the Douglas case and the code section can be effected by holding 
that the State has the novel and unreasonable rule that interpretation is 
governed by the law of the place of performance, and validity by that of 
the place of execution.22 This would leave open the question as to what 
law shall govern other contract matters. A sounder solution of the entire 
problem would seem to be, to overrule the Douglas case, and hold that, in 
view of the code section, all contract matters are to be governed by the law 
of the place of performance.23 
0KLAHOMA2' 
The leading case is Semrity Trust & Savings Bank of Charles City, 
Iowa v. Gleichmann, 25 adopting the rule that all contract matters are 
governed by the law of the place of performance.26 Its authority is 
weakened by the facts that the contract was made prior to statehood, and 
that the decision is made entirely upon the basis of federal precedents. 
There are later dicta to the same effect.27 Another dictum divides contract 
matters between the law of the places of execution and of performance, 
making a distinction such as that later set forth in the Restatement of 
21Hanson v. Great Northern R. R., 18 N.D. 324, 121 N.W. 78, 138 Am.St.Rep. 
768 (1909); Continental Supply Co. v. Syndicate Trust Co., 52 N.D. 209, 202 N.W. 
404 (1924). 
22See preceding article, at footnotes ##18-21, and text of this article, supra, at 
footnotes ##1-6. 
23See preceding article, at footnotes # #18-21, and text of this article, supra, at 
footnotes ##1-6. 
24The quoted code provision appears in Okla.Comp.Stats.Ann.(l921), §5049, 
enacted 1890. Cal.Civ.Code (1937), §1643, discussed in text, preceding article, at 
footnote #52, and regarded as not controlling, appears in Okla.Comp.Stats.Ann. 
(1921), §5046. The following California code provisions, discussed in the preceding 
article, and also regarded as not controlling, are not in force in Oklahoma: Cal. Code 
Civ.Pro. (1937), §1857, discussed in text, preceding article, at footnote #22; Cal.Civ. 
Code (1937), §3268, discussed in text, preceding article, at footnote #38; Cal.Civ. 
Code (1937), §3541, discussed in text, preceding article, at footnote #54. 
2u5Q Okla. 441, 448, ISO Pac. 908, 910, L.R.A.l91SF 1203, 1207 (1915). 
26It does not appear from the opinion that this holding affected the result. 
While the note involved was payable in Iowa, and one Iowa decision is cited, the 
remainder of the opinion, following the discussion of the conflict of laws point, pro-
ceeds as though the problem were entirely one of general law, and in the process 
two earlier Oklahoma cases are overruled. 
27Legg v. Midland Savings & Loan Co., 55 Okla. 137, 144, 154 Pac. 682, 684 
(1916) (contracts made prior to statehood); Denison v. Phipps, 87 Okla. 299, 304, 
211 Pac. 83, 87 (1922) ; Sheehan Pipe Line Const. Co. v. State Industrial Commis-
sion, 151 Okla. 272, 273, 3 Pac.(2d) 199, 201 (1931) (workmen's compensation case). 
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Conflict of Laws.28 Three cases have given effect to the intention of the 
parties.29 
No state decision has been found referring to the quoted code provi-
sion.29a The tenor of the decision is in harmony with the indication of the 
statute that all contract matters are to be governed by the law of the place of 
performance.30 
SouTH DAKOTA31 
In two decisions, the later one in 1929, the quoted code provision is 
cited, and the rule that the law of the place of performance controls is 
applied to determine negotiability.32 In an early decision there is a weak 
dictum to the same effect in regard to the validity of contracts generally.33 
In two cases decided in 1928, without referring to the code provision, 
the view is adopted, along the lines of the Restatement, that contract matters 
are to be divided between the law of the place of execution and that of the 
place of performance.84 In an early case it was held in regard to trans-
portation contracts that the law of the place of execution is to govern 
construction as to the validity of a stipulation against liability for negli-
2SClark v. First National Bank of Marseilles, Ill., 59 Okla. 2, 4, 157 Pac. 96, 
98 (1916). For discussion of the Restatement distinction, see preceding articlc1 at footnotes ##12-15. The Restatement provisions are quoted in the preceding arttclc, 
p. 351. 
29Bell v. Riggs, 34 Okla. 834, 127 Pac. 427 (1912) ; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. 
Smith, 38 Okla. 157, 132 Pac. 494, Ann.Cas.1915C 620 (1913) ; Midland Savings & 
Loan Co. v. Henderson, 47 Okla. 693, 150 Pac. 868, L.R.A.1916D 745 (1915). The 
causes of action in these cases arose prior to statehood. As to effect to be given to 
intention of the parties, see preceding article, p. 342. 
29aMonahan v. New York Life Ins. Co., 26 Fed.Supp. 859, 862 (D.C. Okla. 
1939), quotes the controlling code provision and applies it in harmony with the views 
expressed in the text. Under Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 Sup.Ct. 817, 82 
L.Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938), this ruling is subordinate to the holdings of the 
state courts. 
30See preceding article, at footnotes ##18-21, and text of this article, supra, at 
footnotes ##1-6. 
31The quoted code provision appears in S.D.Comp.Laws (1929), §876, enacted 
1877. The following California code provisions, discussed in the preceding article, 
and regarded as not controlling, appear in S.D.Comp.Laws (1929), as follows: Cal. 
Civ.Code ( 1937), §1643, discussed in text, preceding article, at footnote #52, is §873; 
Cal.Civ.Codc (1937), §3541, discussed in text, preceding article, at footnote #54, is 
§73. The following California code provisions, discussed in the preceding article, and 
also regarded as not controlling, are not in force in South Dakota: Cal.Code Civ. 
Proc.(1937), §1857, discussed in text, preceding article, at footnote #22; Cal.Civ.Code 
(1937), §3268, discussed in text, preceding article, at footnote #38. 
32 Barry v. Stover, 20 S.D. 459, 461, 107 N.W. 672, 673, 129 Am.St.Rep. 941, 943 
(1906); Sioux Natl. Bank v. Lundberg, 54 S.D. 581, 585, 223 N.W. 826, 827 (1929). 
S3Commercial Bank v. Jackson, 7 S.D. 135, 140, 63 N.W. 548, 550 (1895). The 
same case appears at 9 S.D. 605, 70 N.W. 846 (1897). As to the form of statement 
used in the dictum, sec preceding article, at footnote #23, and said footnote. 
S4Security Holding Co. v. Christensen, 53 S.D. 37, 219 N.W. 949, 950, 60 A.L.R. 
1173, 1176 (1928) (the opinion is not entirely clear that the holding is not dictum); 
State Bank of Alcester v. Weeks, 53 S.D. 260, 220 N.W. 502 (1928) (it is possible 
that the holding is dictum). 
1939] CONFLICT OF LAWS: CONTRACTS 367 
gence.35 The principle upon which the holding is based is not stated. It 
could well be supported upon the ground that when a contract has several 
places of performance, ex necessitate the law of the place of execution 
must control. 36 
In a recent opinion it was held that the law of the forum37 governs all 
defenses in actions upon contracts.38 It is apparent that, in so holding, 
the court was impressed by the fact that the same result would have been 
reached by a presumption of similarity between the law of the place of 
execution and performance and that of the forum. It is hard to believe 
that the court seriously would contend that the South Dakota law would 
always be applied, regardless of the nature of the contract problem, if it 
happened to be presented in the form of a defense. Such a view would 
not be compatible with the requirements of the due process of law clause.39 
In an early case, there was a weak holding in favor of the controlling 
effect of the expressed intention of the parties.40 
The first two paragraphs of the discussion of the decisions of this State 
indicate that they are not in harmony, but the balance is in favor of the 
view that all contract matters are governed by the law of the place of 
performance, both because such is the direction of the latest expression of 
the supreme court of the State, and because, in making the contrary 
holdings, the attention of the court apparently was not directed to the 
relevant code provision.41 
35Meuer v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 11 S.D. 94, 75 N.W. 823, 74 Am.St.Rep. 
774 (1898), passim. It is illogical, in the sentence to which this footnote is appended, 
to speak of validity as a matter of construction, but the court is followed in so 
doing. 
36See preceding article, footnote #7. 
37That is, the jurisdiction in which the litigation occurs. See preceding article, 
at footnote #8. 
SBFirst Nat!. Bank v. Larson, 53 S.D. 262, 220 N.W. 506, 508, 68 A.L.R. 940, 
943 (1928). 
39Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 50 Sup.Ct. 338, 74 L.Ed. 926, 74 A.L.R. 
701 (1930). 
40Jones v. Fidelity Loan & Trust Co., 7 S.D. 122, 129, 63 N.W. 553, 555 (1895). 
In regard to effect to be given to intention of the parties, see preceding article, p.342. 
41That the quoted code provision is persuasive that all contract matters are to 
be governed by the law of the place of performance, see preceding article, at foot-
notes ##18-21, and text of this article, supra, at footnotes ##1-6. 
